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23 ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
recognize the decree of annulment as invalidating the marriage
ab initio as between the parties, saving merely the rights of third
persons which (assuming the marriage to have been valid) arose
prior to the acquisition by the parties of a domicile in the state
decreeing annulment.
The decision of the House of Lords in Salvesen or Von Lorang
v. Administrator of Austrian Property0 makes it clear that an
annulment decree rendered in a state in which the parties acquired
a domicile subsequent to their alleged marriage, based on a finding
that the marriage was invalid in the state of celebration, will be
given retroactive effect in England as a decree in rem, at least
to some extent. A decree of annulment made by a court of
Wiesbaden in which the parties were domiciled was held to defeat
the claim of the British administrator of Austrian property to the
property of the supposed wife who, if married, would have been
an Austrian subject. Since the parties, who had married in France,
had become domiciled in Wiesbaden long prior to the outbreak
of the World War and hence long prior to the time when the ad-
ministrator's claim arose, the question whether the decree affected
retroactively supposed rights of third persons accruing before the
parties acquired a Wiebaden domicile was not before the court and
was not discussed.
The case does not hold or intimate that the state of the domi-
cile alone has jurisdiction to grant annulment and the English courts
have themselves annulled English marriages without regard to the
domicile of the parties." It remains to be seen what, if any, effect
the decision will have in this country. Such American cases as
exist are in hopeless conflict and in most jurisdictions authority
on the point is altogether lacking. Under these circumstances the
decision of the House of Lords is likely to have considerable in-
fluence, although this influence may be lessened by the fact that
a different view of jurisdiction for annulment has been adopted in
the Restatement by the American Law Institute. 2
E. MERRIcx DODD, JR.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEARCH AND SEIZURE-AD ISSIBILITY
OF EVIDENCE ILLEGALLY ACQUIRED BY STATE OFFICERS ACTING TO
ASSIST UNITED STATES.-[United Statesi* Another interesting
point has just been decided by the federal Supreme Court regard-
ing the use of evidence obtained by illegal searches and seizures.
In Gambino v. United States' the facts were that some New York
state troopers. without probable cause and without a search warrant,
arrested Gambino in New York near the Canadian border, illegally
10. Supra, note 1.
11. Simonin v. Mallac (1860) Z Sw. & Tr. 67; Linke v. Van Aerde
(1894), 10 T. L. R. 426.
12. See note 8.
*This note was found among the papers of Dean Hall. While evidently
prepared for publication it had not yet been finally revised by him.-[Ed.]
1. (1927) 48 Sup. Ct. Rep. 137.
COMMENT ON RECENT CASES
searched his car, and seized some liquor being transported therein
in violation of the National Prohibition Act. Gambino and the
liquor were at once turned over to the federal officers by the state
troopers, and, upon the evidence thus obtained, Gambino was con-
victed in the federal courts over his objection to the use there of
the illegally obtained evidence. An affirmance of this by the circuit
court of appeals 2 was reversed in the principal case.
Before this seizure was made the New York state prohibition
enforcement act had been repealed so that what Gambino did was
no offense against state law, but there was a general belief among
state officials that the existing state law required state peace officers
to aid federal officers in enforcing the federal prohibition law. The
court said:
"No federal official was present at the search and seizure, and the
defendants made no attempt to establish that the particular search and
seizure was made in co-operation with federal officials. But the facts of
which we take judicial notice (compare Tempel v. United States 248 U.
S. 121, 130), make it clear that the state troopers believed that they
were required by law to aid in enforcing the National Prohibition Act,
and that they made this arrest, search and seizure, in the performance of
that supposed duty, solely for the purpose of aiding in the federal prose-
cution ...
"We are of opinion that the admission in evidence of the liquor
wrongfully seized violated rights of the defendants guaranteed by the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The wrongful arrest, search, and seiz-
ure were made solely on behalf of the United States. The evidence so
secured was the foundation for the prosecution and supplied the only
evidence of guilt. It is true that the troopers were not shown to have
acted under the direction of the federal officials in making the arrest
and seizure. But the rights guaranteed by the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments may be invaded as effectively by such co-operation as by the state
officers acting under direction of the federal officials. Compare Silver-
thorne v. United States 251 U. S. 385, 392. The prosecution thereupon
instituted by the federal authorities was, as conducted, in effect a ratifi-
cation of the arrest, search, and seizure made by the troopers on behalf
of the United States. Whethert the laws of the state actually imposed
upon the troopers the duty of aiding the federal officials in the enforce-
ment of the National Prohibition Act we have no occasion to inquire.
"The conclusion here reached is not in conflict with any of the ear-
lier decisions of this court in which evidence wrongfully secured by per-
sons other than federal officers has been held admissible in prosecutions
for federal crimes. For in none of these cases did it appear that the
search and seizure was made solely for the purpose of aiding the United
States in the enforcement of its laws." 3
It will be observed that this course of reasoning, if valid,
cannot well be confined to cases like the present one of a sup-
posed attempt to discharge an official duty to aid federal enforce-
ment. It would seem equally to include improper searches and
seizures by private persons, if really done to assist the federal
government. Private raids to obtain evidence for federal use, some-
2. (1927) 16 Fed. (2nd) 1016.
3. 48 Sup. Ct. Rep., at 138-39.
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times advocated by those disatisfied with ineffective official enforce-
ment, would not only be tortious, but would fail to secure evidence
that could be used by the federal courts. Whether such a result
is really required by the supposed policy back of the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments, or whether such policy should be deemed to be
satisfied by civil and criminal prosecutions against the wrongful
actors in illegal seizures, is a difficult question to answer. No doubt
the latter, as effective remedies or deterrents, would be often illusory;
on the other hand, there is a wide-spread belief that, under modern
conditions, some of our constitutional provisions on behalf of persons
accused of crime unfairly handicap the state. There is a good deal
to be said for the view that a correct, even though illegal, guess
that a crime is being committed should not be penalized by its col-
lateral effect upon the evidence thus obtained. See the very well-
considered observations upon this by Cardozo, J., in People v.
Defore,4 which are followed by about two-thirds of the state courts,
contra to the Weeks' and Silverthorne -cases in the federal courts.
See the cases collected in 11 A.L.R. 681; 13 A.L.R. 1,168; 24
A.L.R. 1,408; 32 A.L.R. 408; 41 A.L.R. 1,145.
JAMES PARKER HALL.
MORTGAGES By DEED OF ABSOLUTE CONVEYANCE-NATURE OF-
PAROL RELEASE OF EQUITY OF REDEMfPTIO.-[Illinoisj In the
case of Illinois Trust Co. v. BiboY the court states that where a
mortgage is created by a deed of absolute conveyance, accompanied
by a separate contemporaneous sealed' instrument of defeasance
or reconveyance. the two instruments together constitute a legal, as
distinguished from an equitable, mortgage; that where the instru-
ment of defeasance is not under seal, the deed and instrument of
defeasance constitute merely an equitable mortgage. The case of
Fitch v. Miller2 is cited in support of this distinction. This case
does, indeed, hold that the instrument of defeasance being unsealed,
the deed of conveyance in connection therewith constituted an equit-
able mortgage. In the later elaborately reasoned case of Williams
v. Willianzs the court held that a mortgage created by absolute deed
accompanied by a separate contemporaneous bond to reconvey, did
not "when taken together constitute a common law mortgage, nor
does the legal title remain in the grantor in the deed." 4 The court
accordingly held that the interest or estate of the mortgagor, being
purely equitable, could be validly transferred, by way of gift, by a
mere unsealed assignment written on the bond itself, and a delivery
of the bond so assigned; and that the formalities essential for the
transfer by gift of the ordinary equity of redemption were not,
4. (1926) 242 N. Y. 13.
5. Weeks v. United States (1914) 232 U. S. 383.
6. Silverthorne v. United States (1920) 251 U. S. 385.
1. (1928) 328 Ill. 252, 257.
2. (1902) 200 I1. 170. 65 N. E. 650.
3. (1903) 270 Ill. 552, 68 N. E. 449.
4. At p. 256.
